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Abstract 
Football trading, or the buying and selling of players, is a billion-pound industry 
traditionally having a powerful European market. However, in recent times, this has to 
some degree been challenged by the rise of relatively new markets emerging from China, 
Brazil, Turkey and Russia who are increasingly becoming important countries within the 
football trade market, challenging the traditional status order.  Whilst classical international 
trade theorists would suggest trade is based on advantage through capital or resource, 
economic sociologists depart from this view and argue that this is in fact a dependency 
system, or world systems perspective, placing economic relationships as a core component. 
Therefore, from a network perspective, a key paradigm in economic sociology, we analyse 
the football trade network of China, Brazil, Russia and Turkey to further understand the 
structure and topology, specifically in relation to the world systems perspective. Using 
social network analysis methods, our findings show their network is structured analogous 
to a world-systems perspective with European countries at the core, a semi-periphery 
comprised of developing countries from Europe, Asia, Latin America and a periphery 
containing countries where football is less developed. Furthermore, we identify key strategic 
positioning of countries, such as Turkey and Brazil both representing structural holes acting 
as brokers between the core, semi-periphery and periphery. Therefore, this research 
contributes to the global football industry demonstrating the importance of position within 
the transfer market, whilst contributing directly to the literature in economic sociology.  
  
  
Introduction 
 
Within a world systems perspective of trade, there is a distinct division of labour that 
manifests itself structurally through three layers, a core, semi-periphery and 
periphery. The core representing the elite economies (mostly western), the periphery 
representing predominantly less developed, or global south countries (Therien, 2010), 
with weak economies and governments, and the semi-periphery compromising of 
more developed, often industrial economies (Wallerstein, 2004). Indeed, a world-
systems approach to economic transactions amongst countries has generated 
considerable interest from a variety of different commodity imports and exports (cf. 
Chase-Dunn & Grimes, 1995; Sarajlic et al. 2016; Massey et al., 1993; Nemeth et al. 1985; 
Zhang, 2017), yet the global sports market has had limited attention. This is ironic, 
given that the global sports market has been valued anywhere between $700billion 
and $1.5trillion (A.T. Kearney, 2011; Plunkett Research, 2017). Furthermore, whilst a 
world-systems theory has well established roots in the more sociologically led branch 
of economics, the role of network theory (social network analysis) has been given 
limited attention, with the exception of the exemplary work by Synder and Kick 
(1979), and Kick et al. (2011), even though it is a central theory in the sub-disciplines 
of economic sociology and economic geography. Therefore, in this paper we add to 
the literature by exploring trade in global football through a world-systems 
perspective, adopting a social network perspective to address how this trade is 
structured, with a specific emphasis on footballs emerging global markets, of China, 
Brazil, Turkey and Russia, which we believe are challenging the assumed elite.  
The ‘association football’ (herein football) market remains the largest sports 
market globally, estimated to account for 43% of the market share (A.T. Kearney, 
2011). Expenditure on players represents the largest investment for firms (clubs) in 
the market, with an estimated $4.79billion spent in 2016 (FIFA, 2017a), and $6billion 
in 2017 (FIFA, 2017b). There is considerable value in the global transfer market, which 
  
cuts across national territories, with 15,290 trades (commonly referred to as a transfer) 
taking place between January and October 2017 (ibid.; up from 14,591 in 2016), and 
whilst Europe is involved in a large proportion of these trades, certain global 
emerging markets are increasingly improving their position. Indeed, one such country 
who is China, who were aggressive in their spending, becoming the leading nation in 
player expenditure for the 16/17 winter transfer window, investing £300m,  £100m 
more than England (Deloitte, 2017). Given the significance of football to nations, 
culturally and economically, and the substantial flows of trade globally, football 
warrants academic attention, in similar ways to the trade of precious metals, food, 
minerals, and other consumer products.  
In its simplest form football’s ‘transfer market’ represents trade of services 
where there are sets of buyers and sellers who exchange money to acquire football 
players. As Morrow (1996) notes, the player is not the asset, the service they provide 
is and is thus the traded commodity. Accordingly, in this paper we treat players and 
the service they provide (termed football or talent resource) as an asset being traded 
on the market. Indeed, this ‘market’ becomes more complex when including the loan 
system (a form of cross-subsidisation whereby one club temporarily provides talent 
resources to other clubs for a fixed period-of-time) and free agents (players not 
contracted to a club and therefore are not traded). However, in this paper we restrict 
the analysis to considering only the flow of football services from the selling to buying 
club aggregated to nations, or essentially the flow of money between countries trading 
in the footballing commodity of players.   
The buying and selling of footballing resource, either domestically or 
internationally, create a trade network at an individual club level and, importantly for 
this paper, an aggregated country level network. Unfortunately, very little attention 
has been paid to this aggregated networked model. Yet, over the last decade economic 
network research has grown exponentially – mainly through the contributions of 
Arthur (1999), Wilhite (2001), Jackson (2010, 2014), Vega-Redondo (2007), and Goyal 
  
(2012) (for an introduction see Knoke, 2012). However, network analysis is not 
commonplace within economics. This probably reflects the mainstream neo-classical 
economic foundations upon which international trade theories were developed.  
Under this tradition, various assumptions are made, including: how actors, whether 
individuals, firms or countries, make rational choices to maximise utility/profits 
within a budget constraint; perfect competition within a market allows actors to have 
access to complete information to make a utility/profit maximising decisions that 
satisfy their self-interest (Simon, 1955; Knoke, 2012). In doing so they often reject the 
cultural, religious, political and social relational implications economic sociologist’s 
Mark Granovetter (1985), Nan Lin (2002) and others suggest are embedded in 
economic activity. As such, trade from an economic sociological perspective has 
focused on Immanuel Wallerstien’s (1974) world-systems postulation, that trade 
relations with under-developed resource-rich countries are exploited by the rich 
capital nations; creating a tripartite trade network of the periphery; semi-periphery 
and core. It is this approach that is of interest in this paper.  
With the exception of Liu et al. (2016), football’s international trade network 
remains under-researched. Indeed, whilst Liu et al. (2016) provide insightful work to 
build upon, Wallerstien’s world-systems approach offers a stronger theoretical 
position for which to explore the football trade system.  Therefore, this paper firstly 
aims to provide an exploratory analysis of the football’s emerging markets trade 
network (FEMTN) – made up of China, Russia, Brazil & Turkey, and secondly aims 
to identify if the world-systems postulation holds true within the FEMTN, by 
answering the following research questions;  
i) Which countries occupy powerful or influential positions with the 
FEMTN? 
ii) Does the FEMTN conform to the world-systems perspective? 
  
  
Trade and Networks 
International trade has long been a central concern for disciplines of the social 
sciences, especially within economics, sociology, politics and international relations. 
In its simplest form, it represents economic exchange across country borders and until 
discipline-defining work by Adam Smith (1986 [1776] withWealth of Nations, it was 
considered mercantilist, advocating nationalist protectionism. Since this mercantilist 
era of the 16th, 17th and mid-18th centuries, international trade theories have 
transformed from Adam Smith’s absolute advantage theory of free trade through 
division of labour, to David Ricardo’s (1951[1817]) comparative advantage of cost 
differentiation, later refined and publicised by noteworthy authors, namely, Mill, J.S. 
Mill, Marshall, Torrens, Taussig, Haberler and Samuelson (cf. Chipman, 1965a; 1965b 
Thweatt, 1976; Aldrich, 2004; Ruffin, 2005). However, Ricardian theories of 
international trade did not consider how differentiation occurred, leading Heckscher 
(1919) and Ohlin (1933) to extend the Ricardian theory to account for ‘factor 
endowments’ with the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem (Jones, 1956; Ito, Rotunno & Vézina, 
2017). This theory states that capital rich counties export capital-intensive goods and 
labour rich countries export labour-intensive goods, with both importing the 
alternate. Unfortunately, the assumptions these theories are founded upon, such as 
perfect competition and ubiquitous technology, do not hold true. This is especially the 
case at this point in the 21st Century, where markets have monopolies and oligopolies, 
and countries have different technological advances.  
 
To readjust this imbalance, several trade theorists have attempted to account for 
differentiating technological advances;  Posner’s (1961) Imitation (Technology) Gap 
theory, and imperfect market competition (Krugman, 1979; Brander & Krugman, 
1983), to name two. However, much like previous models of international trade, 
empirical models often fall short of theoretical and mathematical specifications. One 
argument is that they fail to account for the relational elements (and their associated 
  
costs) inherent in trade, something Kranton & Minehart (2001) explored in their theory 
of the Buyer-Seller network, but there remains a serious underdevelopment and 
limitation in the literature accounting for the relational elements of economic activity. 
Indeed, within (neo)-classical economics, the relations between actors has been treated 
as a ‘frictional drag’ impeding competition within markets (Granovetter, 1985:484). 
Which is surprising since Nobel prize-winner Ronald Coase (1960) stated through his 
theory of transaction cost economics that it is the cost of forming and maintaining 
beneficial relationships that dominates decision-making.  
 
 That said, within the ‘complex systems’ literature, the world economy often 
takes centre stage cutting across multiple disciplines; such as physics, computer 
science, economics, finance and international business (Sorrano & Boguna, 2003; 
Garlaschelli at al., 2004; 2005; 2007; 2011ab; 2015; 2017; Fronczak, et al., 2012; Fagiolo et 
al., 2009; 2010; Maratea, Petrosino & Manzo, 2016; Baskaran, et al., 2011; Kali & Reyes, 
2007, 2010; Bargigli & Gallegati, 2011). Whilst these disciplines take our understanding 
of economic networks to another level mathematically and statistically, they often 
omit the position and role within networks which economic sociologists are concerned 
with (Granovetter, 2005; Lin, 2002; Knoke, 2012).  
 
 Contrastingly, world system theorists and, similarly, dependency theorists, 
argue that position within the global trade network is fundamental to economic 
development, given relationships and power dynamics inherent in such systems 
(Frank, 1966; Bornschier & Chase-Dunn, 1985). Wallerstein (1974ab) extended the 
bipartite Marxist-infused dependency theory of the core developed rich capital 
nations exploiting the resources of poor underdeveloped peripheral counties (Frank, 
1966), coining the World-systems theory (or world systems perspective). Wallerstein 
essentially stratified economic development into three components or trading blocks; 
  
a core, a semi-periphery and a periphery (Wallerstein, 1974ab). This was empirically 
supported by Snyder & Kick (1979), who successfully block modelled 118 countries 
into a core (Western Europe, North America, Japan, Australia and South Africa), semi-
periphery (Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, Cuba and Middle Eastern countries) and a 
periphery (Africa, South America and Asian developing countries), whilst also 
accounting for noneconomic relations impacting trade, such as military, treaty 
membership and diplomatic ties. However, Kick et al. (2011) returning to this 1979 
study, following the same economic and noneconomic linkages and logic, found 
similar results with three core trading blocks, the centre core of US, UK, France, 
Germany, Italy and Netherlands along with a Western Europe block (which also 
included Brazil, Turkey and Israel) and Asian block of China, India and Japan along 
with Australia, Canada and South Africa. With other blocks resembling consistent 
(semi) periphery positions (South America, Africa, former Soviet Union countries).  
 
 Whilst these studies offer an exemplary foundation for the exploration of the 
network structure in global trading between nations, we can further draw on 
academic literature within economic sociology to further support these studies. In 
particular, for this paper we are interested in structural and relational embeddedness, 
as proposed by Granovetter (1985; 2017). For Granovetter, all economic behaviour is 
rooted and embedded in social relations, as such decisions, be it buying a football 
player or the trading of diamonds, economic behaviour is structured by social 
interactions and relationships. Indeed, Durkheim’s thoughts within his epitome 
Division of Labour, shares sensibilities to this idea, noting that, “even where society 
rests wholly upon the division of labour, it does not resolve itself into a myriad of 
atoms juxtaposed together, between which only external and transitory contact can be 
established. The members are linked by ties that extend well beyond the very brief 
moment when the act of exchange is being accomplished” (Durkheim, 1984[1893]; 
Granovetter, 2017).   
  
 Embeddedness works on the premise that economic actions (players, clubs, 
countries, federations) are impacted by: connections to others, their position they 
occupy, and also by the structure of the overall network. This idea of embeddedness 
is contrary to the neo-classical frameworks dominant in economics, which are based 
on utility maximisation and rational atomised actors, placing great emphasis on how 
position and structure constrain behaviour. The idea of position is a central argument 
in this paper.  Ronald Burt (1992), in thinking about position in a network – especially 
in relation to the advantage that it can create, coined the term ‘structural hole’. For 
Burt, individual or organisations with ties into multiple networks that are otherwise 
unconnected enjoy a competitive and strategic advantage. In such a situation, the said 
actor spans what Burt calls a structural hole, thus controlling what is flowing through 
the network. Being in such a strategic potion allows them to exploit the structural hole 
in the networks they join (Burt, 1992). Individuals are effectively brokers and can thus 
leverage and trade off what is flowing, be it money or information. 
 
Football’s trade network has been seldom researched in terms of world-
systems or, for that matter, through the principles of embeddedness. Hence, we 
address this by placing structure through networks at the centre of our 
methodological approach, bringing these two concepts together. Furthermore, as an 
extra nuance we explore these network structures focusing on key emerging countries 
in football trade, id est those countries which are growing in statue as a force within 
the football market, these include; China, Brazil, Turkey and Russia. The rationale for 
this is two-fold. First, not only do these countries feature as core blocks within Kick’s 
et al. (2011) study, but they are all ranked as highly significant internationally trading 
countries within their respective football confederations (FIFA, 2017). Taking an 
exploratory approach, this paper will identify if the football trade involving the 
emerging markets can be stratified into different positions, matching onto results 
reported in previous literature on world-systems approach. In addition, network 
  
analysis will provide fundamental network metrics which will allow us to position 
football research within the wider literature on trade. A key pre-request for structural 
analysis of this kind is noted by Borgatti & Halgin (2011), identifying that prior to 
analysing a network, the boundary must be defined, and, following the nominalist 
view (Knoke & Yang, 2008), in this instance the boundary of football’s emerging 
market trade network (FEMTN) comprises of international football trade concerning 
the aforementioned countries. Thus, we can treat this as a whole network for these 
countries, though it is acknowledged this is an ego network of these four counties 
from the larger global football trade network.  
 
Method and Data  
To investigate the FEMTN, we utilise Network Analysis – often referred to as Social 
Network Analysis (SNA). The essence of SNA can be traced back to Georg Simmel 
(1922 [1955]) in his The Web of Group Affiliations, however it was social psychologist 
Jacob Moreno (1932; 1934) who first developed the sociogram – what is now the 
classical visual representation of networks. Yet, it was Cartwright & Harary (1977) 
who gave the sociogram a solid grounding in Graph Theory – which is now the norm 
in today’s SNA. A network or graph describes a set of elements, termed nodes, vertices 
or actors, that are connected through interactions and relationships, termed edges or 
ties (Vega-Redondo, 2007). Following Wasserman & Faust (2009) and De Benedictis et 
al. (2014) a graph is noted as G = (V, L) compromised of a set of nodes V (or vertices or 
actors) and a set of edges L (or ties or links), or L∈V×V. In this paper we identify n = 69 
different countries involved in the FEMTN, V = (1, 2, 3, …, 69) with 203 football 
transfers (trade connections) between them, thus L = (1, 2, 3, …, 203). By knowing who 
trades with whom we are able to create a network visualisation  of the structure of 
these trading patterns. 
  
Moreover, as the edges follow the direction of trade (otherwise referred to as 
arcs), from exporting country i to importing country j, then, Lij ∈ {0,1}, with Lij = 1 
showing a trade relationship and Lij = 0 where a trade relationship does not exist. This 
can be represented in an asymmetric adjacency matrix, A = n x n (n representing the 
number of nodes in the network). Hence, Lij in the adjacency matrix A is not equal to 
Lji, or, the edge from country i to j, does not necessarily imply an edge from country j 
to i exists nor does it mean the weight is equal if one does.  
If we then account for the weight of the trade relationship between i and j, and 
other relevant information on the nodes and arcs then the network can be noted as N 
= (G (V, L), W, P). With W representing edge characteristics, such as value of the 
relationship and P includes node specific information, in this instance the country 
label following ISO 3 country codes. In addition to the exogenous information for both 
W and P, endogenous information can also be included, mostly those associated with 
the topological properties of the node (country) within the trade network structure. It 
is the topological properties of the FEMTN that is of interest to this paper and the 
following presents such. Following previous work by Liu (2016) all football trade data 
for the 16/17 season was compiled from Opta Sports’ transfer database 
soccerway.com. To validate the data, all observations were corroborated with 
transfermarkt.com – another industry provider of football transfer data, and news 
outlets such as BBC sport, ESPN, The Telegraph and The Guardian. Network 
properties were calculated and visualised using the network software UCINET 
(Borgatti, Everett & Freeman, 2002) and Figure 1 was generated using Gephi software 
(Bastian, Heymann & Jacomy, 2009). The circles represent countries and the lines that 
join these countries are arcs or edges, which represent a transaction. Furthermore, the 
edge/arc is also weighted here to account for the volume of transactions between two 
nodes, whilst the size of the nodes represents how central they are, larger being more 
central. In the following section we use this socio-gram (Figure 1) as a visual guide to 
exploring the network through various graph metrics and network analysis. 
  
 
Figure 1: Trade Map of FEMTN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
Football’s Emerging Market Trade Network Properties 
The most common and simplest endogenous network properties are those associated 
with centrality, which is a measure of how central a country is within the trade 
network. Jackson (2010) notes that there are four main measures of how central a node 
or actor maybe, these include; degree centrality (CD) which measures a node’s 
connectedness to other nodes; closeness centrality (CC) a measure indicating how easy 
a node can be reached by other nodes; betweeness centrality (CB) a measure of the 
nodes importance in terms of connecting other nodes; we term the final type 
‘centrality power’ which incorporates two related measures, eigenvector centrality, 
(CE), and Bonacich centrality (CP), representing the importance, centrality and 
influential a node’s neighbours are. Fundamentally, centrality measures can identify 
those actors who hold power and influence within networks, so these measures are 
well placed to provide insight to the structure of the trade network and the position 
of certain countries within it. Furthermore, it allows us, somewhat superficially, to 
explore ideas of embeddedness (Granovetter, 1985) and positions of advantage such 
as structural holes and brokerage (Burt, 1992). That is, these measures will enable us 
to explore positions of countries within our bounded network, allowing us to interpret 
the position in relation to the theoretical frameworks introduced earlier in the paper. 
In the following section we articulate our use of these centrality measures as they are 
central to our arguments, we start with the simplest measure degree centrality. Table 
1 includes the results of the measures.  
 
  
  
Table 1. Topological  Properties of the FEMTN 
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i 𝐶𝐷𝑜𝑢𝑡
𝑖  𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑛
𝑖  𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑡
𝑖  𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑛
𝑖  𝐶𝐵
𝑖  𝐶𝐸
𝑖  𝐶𝑃𝑖𝑛
𝑖  𝐶𝑃𝑜𝑢𝑡
𝑖  
Effect 
Size 
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sent 
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G 
0.0
59 
0.0
29 
0.3
6 
0.3
89 0 
0.1
52 
-
0.3
09 
0.2
84 2.427 0.607 0.621 4 0 0 0 0 0 
A
US 
0.0
15 
0.0
44 
0.2
98 
0.4
22 0 
0.0
03 
0.0
15 0 2.549 0.85 0.941 3 0 0 0 0 0 
A
UT 
0.0
44 0 
0.3
45 0.2 0 
0.0
64 0 
0.0
16 1.912 0.637 0.789 3 0 0 0 0 0 
AZ
E 
0.0
29 0 
0.3
38 0.2 0 
0.0
05 0 
0.0
41 1.562 0.781 0.889 2 0 0 0 0 0 
BE
L 
0.0
44 
0.0
29 
0.3
56 
0.4
02 0 
0.0
15 
0.0
59 
0.0
3 2.08 0.693 0.494 3 0 0 0 0 0 
BG
R 
0.0
15 
0.0
44 
0.3
09 
0.4
22 0 
0.0
04 
0.0
06 
0.0
22 2.153 0.718 0.626 3 0 0 0 0 0 
BI
H 
0.0
15 0 
0.3
19 0.2 0 
0.0
01 0 
0.0
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
BL
R 
0.0
15 
0.0
29 
0.3
09 
0.4
02 0 
0.0
02 
0.0
05 
0.0
12 1.223 0.612 0.667 2 0 0 0 0 0 
BO
L 
0.0
15 
0.0
15 
0.3
25 
0.3
6 0 
0.0
01 
0.0
06 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
BR
A 
0.4
71 
0.4
12 
0.4
22 
0.5
27 27.838 
0.2
41 
0.1
25 
0.1
6 36.617 0.939 0.207 4 79 221 179 0 331 
C
HE 
0.0
29 
0.0
29 
0.3
33 
0.4
02 0 
0.0
1 
0.0
12 
0.0
89 1.489 0.745 0.751 2 0 0 0 0 0 
C
HL 
0.0
15 
0.0
29 
0.3
25 
0.4
12 0 
0.0
04 
0.0
16 
0.0
02 1.483 0.742 0.705 2 0 0 0 0 0 
C
H
N 
0.1
91 
0.3
53 
0.3
78 
0.4
86 9.191 
0.6
14 
0.1
45 
0.1
61 26.42 0.911 0.265 4 32 63 71 0 87 
C
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0.0
29 
0.0
15 
0.3
43 
0.3
6 0 
0.0
1 
0.0
04 
0.0
1 1.458 0.729 0.915 2 0 0 0 0 0 
CY
P 0 
0.0
15 0.2 
0.3
91 0 
0.0
01 
0.0
05 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
CZ
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44 
0.0
29 
0.3
4 
0.4
02 0.02 
0.0
38 
0.0
17 
0.0
02 2.093 0.698 0.57 3 0 0 0 1 0 
DE
U 
0.0
59 
0.0
44 
0.3
6 
0.4
33 0.02 
0.1
41 
0.1
81 
0.1
97 2.82 0.705 0.397 4 1 0 0 0 0 
D
N
K 
0.0
29 
0.0
15 
0.3
29 
0.3
84 0.02 
0.0
18 
0.0
07 
-
0.0
07 
1.965 0.983 0.601 2 0 0 0 1 0 
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U 
0.0
15 0 
0.3
3 0.2 0 
0.0
07 0 
0.0
04 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
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Y 
0.0
15 0 
0.3
02 0.2 0 
0.0
27 0 
-
0.0
35 
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
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P 
0.0
44 
0.0
44 
0.3
4 
0.4
33 0.02 
0.1
63 
0.4
34 
0.3
26 2.712 0.678 0.416 4 1 0 0 0 0 
ET
H 
0.0
15 0 
0.3
13 0.2 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
FI
N 0 
0.0
15 0.2 
0.3
7 0 
0.0
01 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
FR
A 
0.0
44 
0.0
59 
0.3
56 
0.4
44 0 
0.0
73 
0.0
45 
0.6
39 2.866 0.717 0.622 4 0 0 0 0 0 
GB
R 
0.0
44 
0.0
44 
0.3
49 
0.4
33 0.02 
0.4
54 
0.1
91 
-
0.2
52 
2.653 0.663 0.609 4 1 0 0 0 0 
GE
O 
0.0
15 
0.0
15 
0.3
27 
0.3
66 0 
0.0
02 0 0 1.723 0.862 0.587 2 0 0 0 0 0 
GR
C 
0.0
29 
0.0
44 
0.3
29 
0.4
33 0.02 
0.0
66 0.1 
0.0
17 2.757 0.689 0.483 4 1 0 0 0 0 
H
K
G 
0 0.0
15 0.2 
0.3
45 0 0 
-
0.0
03 
0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
H
RV 
0.0
29 
0.0
29 
0.3
29 
0.3
95 0.02 
0.0
09 
0.0
15 
0.0
33 1.98 0.99 0.653 2 0 0 0 1 0 
H
U
N 
0.0
15 
0.0
15 
0.3
16 
0.3
66 0 
0.0
03 0 
0.0
06 1.223 0.612 0.667 2 0 0 0 0 0 
IN
D 
0.0
15 0 
0.3
3 0.2 0 
0.0
01 0 
0.0
01 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
IR
N 
0.0
44 
0.0
15 
0.3
56 
0.3
84 0 
0.0
05 
0.0
12 
0.0
45 2.095 0.698 0.623 3 0 0 0 0 0 
IR
Q 
0.0
15 0 
0.3
19 0.2 0 0 0 
0.0
01 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
IS
R 
0.0
29 
0.0
29 
0.3
29 
0.4
12 0.02 
0.0
37 
0.0
83 
0.0
19 2.535 0.845 0.495 3 0 0 0 1 0 
IT
A 
0.0
59 
0.0
44 
0.3
6 
0.4
22 0.02 
0.1
5 
0.5
98 
0.3
46 2.877 0.719 0.455 4 1 0 0 0 0 
JP
N 
0.0
44 
0.0
29 
0.3
49 
0.4
12 0.02 
0.0
13 
0.0
86 
0.0
46 2.424 0.808 0.558 3 0 0 0 1 0 
K
AZ 
0.0
15 0 
0.3
13 0.2 0 
0.0
02 0 
0.0
18 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
K
OR 
0.0
29 
0.0
29 
0.3
33 
0.3
89 0 
0.0
08 
-
0.2
31 
-
0.0
06 
1.659 0.83 0.566 2 0 0 0 0 0 
K
W
T 
0.0
15 0 
0.3
02 0.2 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
  
LV
A 
0.0
15 0 
0.3
13 0.2 0 
0.0
02 0 
0.0
18 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
M
AR 
0.0
15 0 
0.3
19 0.2 0 0 0 
0.0
04 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
M
D
A 
0 0.0
15 0.2 
0.3
66 0 
0.0
01 
0.0
03 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
M
EX 
0.0
15 
0.0
29 
0.3
25 
0.4
12 0 
0.0
18 
0.0
67 
0.0
09 1.46 0.73 0.892 2 0 0 0 0 0 
M
LT 0 
0.0
15 0.2 
0.3
66 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
M
NE 
0.0
29 0 
0.3
38 0.2 0 0 0 
0.0
02 1.607 0.803 0.996 2 0 0 0 0 0 
M
YS 
0.0
15 
0.0
15 
0.3
25 
0.3
6 0 0 
0.0
02 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
NL
D 
0.0
59 
0.0
29 
0.3
6 
0.4
12 0.02 
0.0
23 
0.0
01 
-
0.0
07 
2.611 0.653 0.666 4 1 0 0 0 0 
N
OR 
0.0
15 
0.0
29 
0.3
16 
0.3
93 0 
0.0
04 
-
0.0
03 
0.0
18 2.194 0.731 0.689 3 0 0 0 0 0 
PE
R 
0.0
15 0 
0.3
3 0.2 0 
0.0
01 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
PO
L 
0.0
44 
0.0
29 
0.3
4 
0.4
12 0.02 
0.0
06 
0.0
18 
0.0
13 2.937 0.734 0.586 4 1 0 0 0 0 
PR
T 
0.0
59 
0.0
29 
0.3
6 
0.4
12 0.02 
0.0
82 
0.3
47 
0.1
01 2.992 0.748 0.511 4 1 0 0 0 0 
PR
Y 0 
0.0
15 0.2 
0.3
66 0 
0.0
05 
0.0
32 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Q
AT 
0.0
15 
0.0
15 
0.3
25 
0.3
6 0 
0.0
06 
0.0
22 
0.0
03 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
RO
U 
0.0
29 0 
0.3
38 0.2 0 
0.0
12 0 
0.1
12 1.464 0.732 0.715 2 0 0 0 0 0 
RU
S 
0.3
09 
0.4
41 
0.3
95 
0.5
35 19.377 
0.4
2 
0.1
25 
0.1
58 30.254 0.818 0.37 4 45 134 133 0 239 
SA
U 
0.0
29 0 
0.3
49 0.2 0 
0.0
03 0 
0.0
16 1.546 0.773 0.582 2 0 0 0 0 0 
SR
B 
0.0
29 
0.0
15 
0.3
33 
0.3
64 0 
0.0
15 
-
0.0
01 
0.1
41 1.218 0.609 0.672 2 0 0 0 0 0 
SV
K 
0.0
15 0 
0.3
19 0.2 0 
0.0
02 0 
0.0
21 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
SV
N 
0.0
29 0 
0.3
38 0.2 0 
0.0
04 0 
0.0
36 1.44 0.72 0.686 2 0 0 0 0 0 
S
W
E 
0.0
44 
0.0
15 
0.3
4 
0.3
84 0.02 
0.0
24 
0.0
52 
0.0
28 2.289 0.763 0.534 3 0 0 0 1 0 
  
TH
A 
0.0
15 
0.0
15 
0.3
11 
0.3
62 0 
0.0
05 
0.0
26 
0.0
07 1.773 0.887 0.858 2 0 0 0 0 0 
TU
N 
0.0
15 0 
0.3
19 0.2 0 
0.0
01 0 
0.0
06 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
TU
R 
0.3
82 
0.5
88 
0.4
05 
0.5
81 25.525 
0.2
41 
0.1
24 
0.1
59 41.797 0.95 0.216 4 97 278 184 0 394 
U
AE 
0.0
44 
0.0
29 
0.3
49 
0.4
12 0.02 
0.0
66 
0.0
8 
-
0.0
08 
2.382 0.794 0.451 3 0 0 0 1 0 
U
KR 
0.0
29 
0.0
29 
0.3
29 
0.3
95 0.02 
0.0
08 
0.0
14 
0.0
67 1.987 0.993 0.993 2 0 0 0 1 0 
UR
Y 
0.0
44 
0.0
29 
0.3
56 0.4 0 
0.0
22 
0.0
08 
0.1
06 2.111 0.704 0.493 3 0 0 0 0 0 
US
A 
0.0
15 
0.0
15 
0.3
25 
0.3
6 0 
0.0
06 
0.0
04 
0.0
03 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
UZ
B 
0.0
15 
0.0
15 
0.3
09 
0.3
64 0 
0.0
05 0 
0.0
15 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
VE
N 0 
0.0
15 0.2 
0.3
66 0 
0.0
01 
0.0
07 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
 
 
 
  
Degree Centrality 
Degree centrality is the simplest property of network position for a node or, in our 
case, trading country. Essentially, this metric measures centrality based on the number 
of connections a node has. Formally, the normalised measure of CD can be written as;  
 
𝐶𝐷 =
∑ ℒ𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑗≠𝑖
(𝑁 − 1)
 
 
 Normalising this measure is often used for comparisons of differing network 
size or time, and although we do not use it for those purposes here, it give a better 
understanding of node degree centrality in relation to the whole FEMTN network; 
hence N – 1 (N representing the total number of nodes in G). Moreover within a 
directed network, such as the FEMTN, there are two measures of degree centrality; in-
degree – based on the number of arcs flowing into a node, and out-degree – 
articulating the number of arcs exiting a node. Therefore, in-degree, noted as ∑ ℒ𝑗𝑖
𝑁
𝑗≠𝑖 , 
for the FEMTN represents the total number of football (player) imports (or purchases) 
of country i, and out-degree, noted as ∑ ℒ𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑗≠𝑖 , shows the total number of football 
(player) exports (or sales) of country i. The formal notations are as follows: 
 
𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑛
𝑖 =
∑ ℒ𝑗𝑖
𝑁
𝑗≠𝑖
(𝑁 − 1)
 
 
𝐶𝐷𝑜𝑢𝑡
𝑖 =
∑ ℒ𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑗≠𝑖
(𝑁 − 1)
 
 
  
 Not accounting for the weight of the ties, Table 1 presents these results. 
Although the emerging market countries will demonstrate higher in/out degree than 
other countries, we can still derive some insightful information. Firstly, based on out-
degree, China is the least central to the FEMTN network, with 𝐶𝐷𝑜𝑢𝑡
𝐶𝐻𝑁 = 0.191 suggesting 
they sell the least players within the network. More interestingly, the selling trade 
flow (out-degree) shows Brazil to be the most central 𝐶𝐷𝑜𝑢𝑡
𝐵𝑅𝐴 = 0.471, which is larger than 
Turkey, 𝐶𝐷𝑜𝑢𝑡
𝑇𝑈𝑅 = 0.382, and Russia, 𝐶𝐷𝑜𝑢𝑡
𝑅𝑈𝑆  = 0.309, implying that Brazil is central to player 
sales within the emerging markets. Arguably, this aligns to footballs division of 
labour, as Brazil has long been considered producers of strong footballers in great 
quantities.  Similarly, within the buying flow, China is the least central, 𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑛
𝐶𝐻𝑁= 0.353, 
although it is considerably more than its in-degree, suggesting they concentrate on 
importing players over exporting players, which is perhaps part of a wider strategy. 
Unlike Brazil which is also central to the buying flow of trade within the emerging 
markets, 𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑛
𝐵𝑅𝐴 = 0.412. However, Turkey, 𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑛
𝑇𝑈𝑅 = 0.588, is the most central to importing 
players within the FEMTN, followed by Russia, 𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑛
𝑅𝑈𝑆 = 0.441, suggesting Russia, and 
more so, Turkey are influential in terms of acquiring players in the FEMTN. Accepting 
that those with more connections have more power (Newman, 2008), then Brazil and 
Turkey therefore have the most seller and buyer power respectively.  
 
 Within the emerging market’s nodes, that is who our four countries are 
connected to through trade, there are signs of other countries taking central roles – 
albeit marginal to China, Brazil, Russia and Turkey. For example, Table 1 shows 
Portugal, Netherlands, Italy Germany and Argentina as all having the highest out-
degree centrality, 𝐶𝐷𝑜𝑢𝑡
𝑖  = 0.059, followed by a group of 12 countries (Uruguay, United 
Arab Emirates, Sweden, Poland, Japan, Iran, France, England, Spain, Czech Republic, 
Austria, Belgium) with an out-degree of 𝐶𝐷𝑜𝑢𝑡
𝑖  = 0.044. This identifies two influential 
groups of countries, predominantly European, who are exporting players to the 
FEMTN, potentially taking advantage of the emerging markets football talent 
  
(resource).  Conversely, there are less countries purchasing players from emerging 
market’s with France taking a prominent central position 𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑛
𝐹𝑅𝐴 = 0.059, followed by 
other European countries Bulgaria, Germany, Spain, England, Greece and Italy, with 
an in-degree, 𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑛
𝑖  = 0.044. Again, it is the predominantly European countries who 
demonstrate a central role with the FEMTN. Seemingly, the top-5 footballing countries 
globally, England, Spian, Germany, Italy and France, are consistently central to both 
flows of trade for the FEMTN, regardless of who is exploiting whom, it is clear that 
these countries have strategic positions within the network. That said, further research 
is needed, looking at the whole global football trade network to understand these 
strategic roles further. However, at this stage we see a complex structure emerging of 
trade between European traditional football trade markets and their relationship with 
emerging markets.  
 
Closeness Centrality  
Another commonly observed endogenous nodal property is closeness centrality, 
which refers to topological distance, or how close a node is to all other nodes. This is 
an important concept as it shows how close countries are to each other, based on trade. 
Generally, distance in a network relates to the number of steps node i requires to reach 
another node j, with the minimum path distance between i and j termed the geodesic 
distance. Inversing the average geodesic distance provides a proximity measure, with 
high scores showing nodes are closer to reachable nodes, noted as:   
 
𝐶𝐶
𝑖 =
(𝑁 − 1)
∑ 𝒟𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑗≠𝑖
 
 
With 𝒟𝑖𝑗 representing the geodesic distance between i and j. If each country i in the 
FEMTN is connected to all others, 𝒟𝑖𝑗 would equal 1, hence the less country i is directly 
  
connected to nodes the smaller their closeness centrality. However, akin to degree 
centrality within a directed network, the geodesic distance for i and j may differ 
depending on the nodal order for example 𝒟𝑖𝑗  may not equal 𝒟𝑗𝑖 . Therefore, in-
closeness and out-closeness can be measured following:  
 
𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑛
𝑖 =
(𝑁 − 1)
∑ 𝒟𝑗𝑖
𝑁
𝑗≠𝑖
 
 
𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑡
𝑖 =
(𝑁 − 1)
∑ 𝒟𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑗≠𝑖
 
 
Out-closeness, or 𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑡
𝑖  represents distance from export partners (buyers) and in-
closeness, or 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑛
𝑖 represents distance from import partners (sellers).  
 
Closeness centrality garners similar results as degree centrality, but offers 
further support to our propositions within this paper.  Brazil, 𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑡
𝐵𝑅𝐴 = 0.422 is most 
central to exporting players, with Turkey (𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑛
𝑇𝑈𝑅  = 0.581) most central to importing 
players, based on proximity. However, China becomes substantially more central 
𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑡
𝐶𝐻𝑁 = 0.378 and 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑛
𝐶𝐻𝑁 = 0.486, with a significant increase in centrality for the selling 
flow. Thus, what this demonstrates is that if China wanted to increase its out-degree 
centrality, it has the network capability to do so. That said, the emerging market’s 
alters have very similar out-closeness generally 𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑡
𝑖  > 0.3, suggesting that China does 
not have much of a strategic position within the exporting market, but does have the 
network capacity to reverse this.  
 
  
 Within the buying market, however, there appears to be a group of European 
countries taking a more influential position than the rest, mainly France, 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑛
𝐹𝑅𝐴 = 0.444 
followed by England, Spain, Germany and Greece, 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑛
𝑖  = 0.433, and Italy, 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑛
𝐼𝑇𝐴 = 0.422. 
Very similar to degree centrality, the European elite – those countries with the top-5 
leagues (Deloitte, 2017) – have an influential position on the FEMTN. This implies a 
European elite has the shortest paths – or are close – to the majority of other FEMTN 
countries, meaning they are able to take advantage of this when purchasing talent 
(assets). This may go some way to explaining why Europe is considered the most 
important part of the global football industry.  
 
Betweenness Centrality  
Betweenness centrality is an indicator of prestige, referring to the extent to which node 
i is involved in the geodesic distance of two unconnected nodes, j and k. It is therefore 
essential to the indirect link between j and k. This form of centrality has important 
strategic implications that can be exploited and leveraged for advantage. Thus, the 
betweenness centrality of country i represents the proportion of geodesic distances i 
is involved in indirectly connecting country j and k (Vega-Redondo, 2007). A 
standardised measure based on Freeman’s (1979) idea is presented by De Benedictis 
& Tajoli (2011) is: 
 
𝐶𝐵
𝑖 =
∑
𝒟𝑗𝑘
𝑖
𝒟𝑗𝑘𝑗≠𝑘
(𝑛 − 1)(𝑛 − 2)
 
 
𝐶𝐵
𝑖  represents betweeness, 𝐶𝐵 , for actor i, with 𝒟𝑗𝑘 noting the sum of geodesic distance 
between alters j and k, and 𝒟𝑗𝑘
𝑖  noting those geodesic distances between j and k 
involving i. Thus, a high 𝐶𝐵  measure suggests country i trades with more 
  
unconnected trade partners, which can provide a strategic role within the network 
(structural hole). As the nodes are already ordered, then this measure does not 
provide separate in/out measures (Wasserman & Faust, 2009).  
 
Brazil and Turkey’s apparent dominance within the FEMTN is more visible 
when exporting thus measure. Indeed, these two countries scores demonstrate the 
highest betweeness centrality out of the emerging market countries, 𝐶𝐵
𝐵𝑅𝐴 = 27.838 and 
𝐶𝐵
𝑇𝑈𝑅 = 25.525. This demonstrates the powerful position these countries take within this 
network, as they are trading with unconnected partners, which means they occupy 
somewhat of a structural hole and act as a broker within the network (Burt, 1992). 
Interestingly, China’s betweeness is comparatively low 𝐶𝐵
𝐶𝐻𝑁 = 9.191, meaning it trades 
more with connected partners, reducing their importance within the network. This 
may evidence China’s football strategy; that is, to create and maintain relations with 
well-connected or central countries. However, this may be considered 
counterproductive in that it weakens China’s position in terms of leverage, at least 
following Burt’s (1992) supposition.   
 
Whilst it is expected that the emerging market countries have exponential 
values to other countries, there is a group of 16 countries, 𝐶𝐵
𝑖  = 0.02, who are positioned 
between two unconnected trade partners – demonstrating that the FEMTN (hence 
China, Brazil, Turkey and Russia), are reliant on these countries to connect to the 
network, collectively providing influence and power.  This not only includes the 
already established and dominant European countries, but also, United Arab 
Emirates, Japan and Israel, among others. Again, this indicates each of these countries 
have an advantaged position in the network as they connect unconnected nodes.  
 
Structural Holes 
  
As previously mentioned in this paper, the idea of betweeness underpins Burt’s 
(1992) postulation of structural holes, which also forms part of Granovetter’s 
structural embbeddness framework. Burt proposed two extensions to the idea of 
betweeness; effect size and constraint. Effect size is based on the premise that if a 
node’s alters are connected, then the node’s connections are redundant. For example, 
if node i is connected to node j and q – (i,j) and (i,q), – but node j is connected to q (j,q) 
then i’s connection to j is redundant. Essentially effect size is based on the number of 
redundant ties an ego has. Whilst Burt (1992) provides detailed commentary, Borgatti 
(1997) supposed that redundancy is merely the number of alters a node has, minus 
the average degree of alters not including ties to that particular node, and therefore 
offers a simplistic alternative measure:  
 
𝑅𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 =
2𝑡
𝑛
 
 
where t represents the number of ties in the network (not counting ties to ego) 
and n denotes the number of nodes (excluding ego), which means effect size can be 
written;  
 
𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 = 𝑛 −
2𝑡
𝑛
 
 
Furthermore, as this measure is contingent on degree, it can be normalised by dividing 
the effect size by the number of ties a node has, leading to what is termed efficiency 
(Hanneman & Riddle, 2005; Borgatti, Everett & Freeman, 2002). As a result of the 
boundary set from this study, the FEMTN efficiency metric is of more interest here, as 
naturally the emerging market countries will have larger effect sizes. Also 
noteworthy, those with 100% efficiency are those peripheral countries, with only 1 
  
trade partner which is again a result of the boundary construction, not necessarily 
exploitable position in the network. 
What these measures do show us is that Turkey, China, Brazil and Russia are 
in dominant positions with >90% efficiency, suggesting the majority of their trade 
partners do not trade with each other. It must be noted this is expected considering 
the boundary set for this network was China, Brazil Turkey and Russia, therefore we 
do not account for trade between other countries in this study. Nevertheless, out of 
the emerging market countries Russia has the weakest position with 81% efficiency, 
demonstrating that 19% of Russia’s football trade relations are redundant – as their 
trade partners also trade together, which is considerably lower than, Turkey, China 
and Brazil all with >90% efficiency. Therefore, Turkey, China and Brazil are trading 
with partners who do not trade with each other meaning, Turkey, China and Brazil 
are more integral to their trade partners, giving them a slight advantage over Russia. 
In other words, China, Turkey and Brazil occupy structural holes within the network 
(Burt, 1992) meaning they have an exploitable position over Russia, because their 
trade partners are more reliant on maintaining trade relations. Interestingly, 
Argentina (60%), Austria (63%), Bulgaria (61%), Hungry (61%), Serbia (60%) and 
Netherlands (65%) demonstrate some of the weakest positions as nearly 40% of their 
connections are redundant.  This indicates these countries trade with countries who 
also trade with each other, meaning they have little leverage, and are open to being 
exploited by other countries through paying inflated prices for players or selling 
players under value.  
Burt’s constraint idea is also concerned with the idea of redundancy, and 
relates to how constrained a node is by the connection between alters in a node’s 
neighbourhood. In other words, i is constrained when i has invested time and energy 
connecting with j, but then j is surrounded by few structural holes, in that, j has a 
relationship with q in i’s neighbourhood. Thus, i does not have an exploitable position, 
  
as, if i disconnects from j, then j is still reachable by q. Mathematically, Burt’s (1992:55) 
equation 2.4 is as follows; 
 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗 = (𝑃𝑖𝑗 +∑𝑃𝑖𝑞𝑃𝑞𝑗
𝑞
) 2, 𝑖 ≠ 𝑞 ≠ 𝑗 
 
𝑃𝑖𝑗 relates to the proportional strength of i’s relationship with j, and 𝑃𝑖𝑞 denotes the 
strength of i’s relationship with another q where 𝑃𝑞𝑗  depicts the strength of q’s 
relationship with j. Here, the lower the constraint measure the less connected a node’s 
alters are, or in this instance the less alternative trading partners. Accordingly, a 
country who is highly constrained means their trading partners are also trading, 
reducing the strategic position. Indeed, those who are totally constrained, 1, are the 
peripheral countries who had 100% efficiency, again this is due to the boundary 
network set.  
Again, similar to efficiency, Turkey, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗 = 0.216, and Brazil, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗 = 0.207, have 
the most exploitable position as they are least constrained by their trade partners, 
compared to China, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗  = 0.258, and Russia 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗  = 0.35. This implies Turkey and 
Brazil trade with countries that have multiple structural holes, unlike Russia, which 
trades with countries with fewer structural holes. This once again highlights Russia’s 
lack of strategic position within the FEMTN. Interestingly, looking at the European 
elite, Germany 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗 = 0.398, Spain 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗 = 0.416 and Italy 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗 = 0.455 have the most 
exploitable position 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗  = 0.398, and are much less constrained than their 
counterparts, England 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗  = .609 and France 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗  = 0.622. So whilst England and 
France show to be central to the FEMTN they do not have exploitable positions within 
the network – following Burt’s thought on structural holes.  
 
  
Eigenvector centrality  
Proposed by Bonacich (1972a, 1972b) eigenvector centrality extends the notion 
of closeness centrality, however, this focuses on the closeness centrality (or geodesic 
distance) of node i’s alters. Thus, it is a more sophisticated measure of closeness 
centrality as it assumes not all connections are equal - that is, connecting to an 
influential node (country) j provides node (country) i influence within the network, 
and as Newman (2008) formulated it can be expressed as: 
 
𝐶𝐸
𝑖 =
1
𝜆
∑𝐴𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
𝑥𝑗 
 
𝐶𝐸
𝑖  represents the eigenvector, 𝐶𝐸 , for country i where 𝜆 is a constant – relating to the 
largest eigenvalue in the adjacency matrix. This measure shows the proportional 
centrality of country i to the average of i’s neighbourhood (connected alters), inferring 
that those connected to influential or powerful nodes are themselves influential.   
 
Based on this notion of influential power within the network, China, 𝐶𝐸
𝐶𝐻𝑁 = 
0.617, is the most powerful. So whilst China has continuously shown a weaker 
position within the FEMTN based on their topological properties, they are connected 
to the more central countries than any other in the network. Russia, have a moderate 
eigenvector centrality, 𝐶𝐸
𝑖  = 0.42, compared to, Brazil and Turkey, 𝐶𝐸
𝑖  = 0.241, who are 
not connected to other influential countries and therefore have low eigenvector 
centralities. This suggests that while China has not created an important position 
within the network, it has connected itself to the most central countries to garner 
power and influence. Interestingly, England occupies an advantageous position 
within the network 𝐶𝐸
𝐺𝐵𝑅  = 0.454, as it is connected to strongly connected others. 
  
Therefore, England is powerful within the FEMTN because it is connected to other 
high-trading countries.  
 
Bonacich Power 
Whilst eigenvector centrality focuses on a node’s alters’ closeness centrality, Bonacich 
(1987) further proposed the notion of ‘dependency’ referring to a node who’s alters 
have a small degree – rather than a large degree – has more power, because their alters 
are dependent on that connection.  So based on this premise, if country i is connected 
to country j who is not well connected then country i is more powerful because 
country j is dependent on i. Generally, Bonacich’s notation can be given (Borgatti, 
Everett & Freeman, 2002): 
 
𝐶𝑃
𝑖 = ∑𝐴𝑖𝑗(𝛼 + 𝛽𝐶𝑗) 
 
𝐶𝑃
𝑖  represents the centrality power, 𝐶𝑃 , of country i, with 𝛼  being an arbitrary 
standardising constant. 𝛽  represents a positive or negative parameter – positive 
measures i’s power based on well-connected alters (similar to that of eigenvector 
centrality) and negative measures i’s power based on dependency of low-connected 
alters. Thus, we followed the latter to establish which countries are most powerful in 
the FEMTN following Bonacich’s work on dependency. However, the difficulty or 
problem with Bonacich’s parameter 𝛽 is that it is researcher assigned (Scott, 2017); 
therefore we set the 𝛽  value as 1/(n – 1) following Borgatti, Everett and Freeman 
(2002), that is 1/68 = 0.01470588, and because we are interested in who is powerful 
based on dependency then we assign -0.01470588 as the 𝛽  value. To follow the 
direction, the measure is worked out based on in-degree and out-degree – that is who 
is connecting weakly connected nodes from buying (in-degree) or selling (out-degree).  
  
With regards to in-degree, Argentina, 𝐶𝑃𝑖𝑛
𝐴𝑅𝐺 = -0.309, is the weakest country in 
the network in relation to exporting players, because their trade partners all have high 
in-degree and are therefore buying players elsewhere. Hence, Argentina’s selling 
power is low as their trade partners are not dependent upon them. However, this 
shifts when buying players, 𝐶𝑃𝑜𝑢𝑡
𝐴𝑅𝐺 = 0.284, suggesting their trade partners have low out-
degree and therefore are more dependent on Argentina to sell players. In terms of 
selling power within the network, European countries again demonstrate their 
influence, with Italy 𝐶𝑃𝑖𝑛
𝐼𝑇𝐴 = 0.598, Spain 𝐶𝑃𝑖𝑛
𝐸𝑆𝑃 = 0.434 and Portugal 𝐶𝑃𝑖𝑛
𝑃𝑅𝑇 = 0.347 having 
highly dependent alters, meaning they are connected to countries with a low number 
of trade partners to buy players from (in-degree). Arguably, Italy is an important node 
due to the country also having relative power 𝐶𝑃𝑜𝑢𝑡
𝐴𝑅𝐺 = 0.346 in terms of buying power, 
as they are connected to countries with a low number of trade partners to sell player 
to (out-degree). Furthermore, France 𝐶𝑃𝑜𝑢𝑡
𝐹𝑅𝐴 = 0.639, takes the most dominant position 
in terms of buying power, so their trade partners are reliant on their relationship with 
France to sell players, id est, they have minimal trade partners to sell to. Interestingly, 
England demonstrates the weakest position within the network regarding buyer 
power; indicating England’s trade partners have multiple trade partners they sell 
players to, meaning they are not reliant on their trade relationship with England. This 
opens England up to exploitation, that is England being charged more for football 
talent, as trade partners can leverage England’s weak position. 
 
  
  
Sub-groups and World Systems 
The measures of centrality previously discussed in this paper are 
fundamentally about a countries position in the network and in that sense can be 
thought of as operating at the micro level of the network. However, as demonstrated 
by previous research (see Snyder and Kicks, 1979; and Kicks et al. 2011) the actors 
(nodes) in a network, in this case countries, can be grouped together based on trading 
patterns. Essentially, regions and sub-groups within a network identify 
interconnected groups of nodes that can represent the underlying structure to the 
network. Indeed, this can occur at varying degrees; such as a clique – which is the 
strictest form of sub-group, as it requires each node to be connected to one another. 
There are multiple, less stringent, conceptualisations, n-cliques, n-clans, k-plexes – 
which all take a bottom-up approach (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005) – which focus on 
the network from the beginning, or, evolving/emerging from a set of nodes tightly 
interconnected. However, they all have lesser stringent conditions. One of the most 
basic approaches to this is to partition the network based on differing densities, or 
degree, such as k-core which allows nodes to be involved in a clique even though they 
may not have to connections to every other node. Fundamentally, this partitions 
nodes based on k degree. Rather than provide statistical metrics here, we visualise it 
in Figure 1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 2. k-core of the Football’s Emerging Markets Trade Network.  
  
  
 The FEMTN has three groups of countries within the network. Firstly, there is 
a central group of countries, the core, naturally made up of the four ego’s, China, 
Brazil, Turkey, Russia, as well as – and most interesting here – those central European 
countries, Spain, Italy, England, France, Germany, Portugal, Netherland, Poland, 
Greece, along with Argentina. These countries are interlinked, but also link to other 
groups, such as the semi-periphery, that is those countries which trade with the core 
countries, but not the periphery. This is made up of Middle Eastern countries – like 
Saudi Arabia, Israel, Azerbaijan, and Iran –  Asian countries, such as Korea (South), 
Japan, and Thailand, South American countries Chile, Mexico, and Columbia, as well 
as, other European countries, such as Sweden, Switzerland, Denmark, Czech Republic 
and Norway. The final group – the periphery – represents the outer layer countries 
who only trade with the core, and not the other members of the periphery. This is 
generally made up of countries where football is less developed, such as, Egypt, Qatar, 
United States of America, Kazakhstan, Iraq, Ethiopia, Latvia among others.  
Interestingly, using k-core to partition the FEMTN reveals a world-systems 
network that is comparable with the output of Kick et al. (2011), and the ideas of 
Wallerstien (1974a; 1974b) which demonstrated that developed core nations exploit 
underdeveloped peripheral countries. Whilst we do not provide the same level of 
analysis as Kick et al., who utilise a more sophisticated block modelling approach, we 
nevertheless assert that in general those countries where the football market is more 
developed, including the emerging markets, countries form a core which ultimately 
use their position within the network to exploit less developed countries (in a football 
sense).  
 
Brokerage  
Since the k-core produces categorical data, this allows us to investigate brokerage of 
the emerging market countries within the FEMTN. Along with structural holes, Burt 
  
(1992) also used brokerage to understand how an actor is embedded within a network; 
the notion is similar to betweenness in that it focuses on an actor’s role in connecting 
two unconnected actors. Similarly, Gould and Fernandez (1989) also looked at 
brokerage, but focused on an actor’s role within its neighbourhood or between groups. 
In doing so, they provide 5 measures based on the role i plays in connecting j and k, 
depending on the groups these nodes belong. Their measures count how many times 
i is a broker to j and k when: all nodes belong to the same group (j = i = k) – known as 
Coordinator; i is not part of the same group but j and k are (j = k ≠ i) – known as 
Consultant; j is not part of the same group but i and k are (j ≠ i = k) – known as 
Gatekeeper; k is not part of the same group but i and j are (j = i ≠ k) – known as 
Representative; and when all nodes belong to a different group (j ≠ i ≠ k) – known as 
Liasion. For this analysis we used the categorical data provided by the k-core analysis.  
Whilst there are more sophisticated measures, we simply use the count of each 
time a country acts as a broker. Table 1 presents the scores. Out of the emerging market 
countries, Turkey and Brazil act as a broker more so than China and Russia in each 
scenario. In terms of the coordinator role, Turkey brokers trade relations 97 times 
within the network, implying they – along with Brazil (79) – are the main brokers 
within the core. Once more, this identifies Turkey and Brazil being the most central 
and influential countries in the network. Indeed, Brazil and Turkey broker more 
relations connecting each of the groups; Turkey plays the gatekeeper role 278 times 
and Brazil 221, connecting the (semi) periphery groups to the core and alternatively 
connecting the core to the (semi) periphery through the representative role. More 
importantly the two countries are essential in connecting the periphery to the semi-
periphery, playing the liaison role 394 (Turkey) and 331 (Brazil) times respectively. 
Given China’s rise in terms of football, and their vision for its future, it is surprising 
that China do not have a more influential role, having minimal brokerage compared 
to Turkey and Brazil.  This probably reflects on the immaturity of China’s football 
strategy compared to the other countries under investigation.   
  
 
Discussion  
Evidently, applying network analysis to the football trade network, such as the 
emerging markets, yields some interesting insights. At the very basic level – such as 
(in)out-degree – it is clear Brazil and Turkey have distinct roles within the network, 
Brazil predominantly sells players and Turkey predominantly buys players. Although 
they are both central in terms of selling and buying, this arguably follows Heckscher-
Ohlin theorem in that, Brazil are exporting a labour intensive product – footballing 
talent. Interestingly, however, following the same logic, China or Russia would 
represent the capital rich countries and therefore would be expected to be integral to 
the buying market, yet this is Turkey. Though this makes more sense from a world-
systems approach, in that, Turkey being the most developed football country (out of 
China, Russia and Brazil) exploits the less football developed emerging countries 
China, Russia and Brazil (Wallerstien, 1974ab). Further to this, when applying k-core 
to the FEMTN, it identifies sub-groups akin to that of world-systems, very similar to 
the core, semi-periphery and periphery findings of Snyder & Kick (1979) and Kick et 
al. (2011). Therefore, showing how football trade follows a similar global structure to 
other relations as normal trade, diplomatic relations and military alliances, supporting 
Granovetter’s (1985, 2017) embeddedness argument. Indeed, this needs to be further 
explored within the football transfer market, and future research should focus on 
advanced network analysis such as block modelling and equivalence analysis in-line 
with Kick’s (2011) extensive work.    
 
China’s role – or lack of – within the FEMTN is somewhat surprising, given the 
emphasis on their football strategy and football investment. However, this is potential 
result of their strategy of investing – potentially over investing – in European football. 
This is evident through their superior eigenvector score, showing they are well 
  
connected to other well-connected or central countries. Whilst this can provide power 
as they are connected to well-connected (powerful) countries, it means they lack 
exploitable advantageous positions such as being connected to less-connected (weak) 
countries, which are mainly occupied by Brazil and Turkey. Thus Brazil and Turkey 
derive power by developing dependency through trading with poorly-connected 
countries, whereas China garner power through trading with well-connected 
countries. Perhaps this is a consequence of a strategic policy to grow the game 
internally. Consequently, their investment in creating and maintaining strategic 
connections with central countries has resulted in neglecting other, arguably more 
exploitable, positions in the network, such as brokerage (Burt, 1992). That said, 
China’s strategy is not due to lack of access to the network, they have the capacity to 
change their position, as they are central from a closeness perspective, meaning they 
have the proximity to poorly-connected countries. If they were to do so this would 
drastically improve their leverage within the global transfer market.  
 
Brazil and Turkey have clearly adopted a different strategy to China, creating 
powerful and influential positions within the FEMTN, especially in relation to 
occupying structural holes, meaning they broker the majority of relations throughout 
the network, aligning to Burt’s (1992) argument. Especially in terms of their brokerage 
roles of not only connecting the core (coordinator), but more importantly connecting 
the periphery to the semi-periphery (liason), following Gould & Fernandez (1989). 
Therefore, they have very strategic roles providing power and influence over the 
different groups within the network. This may go some way to explain their rise as 
global football powerhouses, which if they further exploit their positions they can 
dominate the emerging markets. 
 
  
The power and influence of European countries is evident, especially the top-5 
leagues, England, France, Italy, Germany and Spain (Deloitte, 2017). However, they 
all have interchangeable advantageous positions throughout the network. For 
example, taking the traditional view of power being inferred by being connected to 
high-trading countries (eigenvector centrality), England has the most powerful 
position. Yet akin to China, this is somewhat counterproductive for England as they 
are highly constrained (Burt, 1992), because they trade with high-trading countries, 
meaning their partners also trade with each other, reducing England’s power – as less 
of the partners need England to trade. Indeed, England is considered the nucleus of 
European football (Deloitte, 2017), however, this finding suggests if this was to 
change, England would not hold a very exploitable position within emerging markets. 
This is further compounded taking the alternative view that power comes from 
trading with low-trading countries (Bonacich, 1987) – because they are more 
dependent on maintaining that connection, thus exploitable. England are very weak, 
mainly because not many of their trading partners are reliant on their relationship, 
meaning England are susceptible to being exploited themselves – which may explain 
the rise in transfer expenditure of top-flight English clubs, which is considerably more 
than the other top-5 European leagues (Deloitte, 2017). To this end, English clubs 
should concentrate their efforts on acquiring talent from less powerful countries, 
similar to that of France, Spain and Portugal, who’s trading partners are reliant on 
their trade, thus reducing the likelihood of exploitation.  
Nevertheless, the continuing importance of the European elite, such as England, Spain and 
France within FEMTN is likely to be bound-up colonial history, as well as language, culture, 
prevailing norms, demonstrating an empirical example of Granovetter’s (1985, 2017) 
embeddedness, which provides trust throughout the network – that is emerging markets 
trust the European elite.  In a similar vein, the football transfer network is embedded 
in various other networks: sporting, industrial, political and more. For example, 
  
China’s reliance on powerful footballing trade partners for their talent supply-chain 
may reflect their state backed football strategy.   
 
From a management perspective, it is apparent countries need to be conscious 
of investment/recruitment strategies influence on network structure and position. For 
example, Russian professional clubs have repeatedly demonstrated a predisposition towards 
signing Brazilian players, while its own domestic talent has evidently not been inclined to 
move overseas. While in China, the government has significantly restricted the flow of 
overseas players into the country at the same time as encouraging young domestic players to 
move overseas to gain experience. Additionally, identification, selection and maintenance of 
footballing resource supply-chain, are important considerations industry leaders need to be 
aware of, especially in terms of over reliance on important and influential countries.    
 
Concluding Remarks 
Whilst we have sought to capture and present the dynamic nature of the football 
player transfer network in this paper, such an analysis is inevitably somewhat static 
in nature. Undertaking further work on a longitudinal basis would partly address 
this, and provide insight to understand how such networks evolve and change over 
time. That said, we have presented an exploratory – and to some degree within sport 
research, novel – investigation into the football transfer from a trade network 
perspective, set in the context of economic sociology. Whilst there are numerous 
limitations, not least, the boundary set for the network is based on four countries; we 
have shown how the position within the football trade network can be exploited, 
thus clubs, countries and in some cases governments can be strategic in their 
footballing endeavors.  
 
We demonstrate that the football transfer network follows a similar structure to that 
of normal trade, political and international relations. However, future research should 
  
focus on the whole network global transfer market to provide better insight to the 
network structure and topological properties of countries, to establish if the world-
systems perspective also holds true – ideally using blockmodeling or similar 
equivalence methods. Similarly, a direct follow-up study should analyse the 
relationship between network position and football talent investment, ideally at a club 
level. This can help ascertain if network positions can lead to a tendency to be 
exploited within the football transfer market, was well as providing much needed 
insight into strategic alliances between football clubs internationally and/or 
domestically. 
As well as functional applications, (social) network analysis can also be used for more critical 
applications such as, understanding the role that – often considered –‘exploited’   countries 
from Africa or South America play within the overall network. Or more controversially, the 
trade of minors or child trafficking throughout the global football transfer network. The 
implications of such can inform the management and policies of football domestically, 
supranationally and globally.  
In practical terms, it is important that officials within the football industry acknowledge and 
embrace the need to adopt appropriate approaches to managing with networks. This not only 
implies a need to understand the connected, embedded nature of transfer activity, it also 
suggests the need to develop competence in the field. For example, issues of partner 
identification, acquisition and management would appear to be an imperative. Similarly, the 
significance of boundary management, collaborating to compete and creating sustainable 
labour supply-chains are pertinent outcomes of this research. Finally, researchers and 
practitioners will hopefully find use in the methods and findings from this paper to 
understand how clubs and countries understand can use trade partners advantageously for 
leverage and potentially, growth.  
 
